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Abstract
In addition to (or sometimes rather than primarily) attribut-
ing it to water scarcity, water crisis has been described as a
‘crisis of governance’; with the word ‘crisis’ also indicating
that water governance lacks (full) legitimacy. The article
undertakes the task to analyse the current status of global
water governance (GWG) from the perspective of two com-
peting theories relating to the legitimacy of global govern-
ance, namely global constitutionalism (GC) and global
administrative law (GAL). Having mapped the current legal
framework of GWG from these two perspectives, it is dis-
cussed how these theories might shape GWG and how this
shaping could contribute to solving the water crisis. In addi-
tion, it is also explored whether reading one of the most
accepted proposals for legitimising global water governance,
the concept of ‘integrated water resources management’
(IWRM), through the lenses of either GC or GAL would
have an impact on how this concept is interpreted, and
whether it can be a useful mechanism to address the water
crisis. The use of two theories analysing the same subject
matter provides interesting insights into global water govern-
ance and the nature of the water crisis as well as the rela-
tionship between these two theories.
Keywords: global water governance, global constitutional-
ism, global administrative law, water crisis, integrated water
resources management
1. Introduction
In addition to (or sometimes rather than primarily)
attributing it to water scarcity, the water crisis has been
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described as a ‘crisis of governance’; with the word ‘cri-
sis’ indicating that global water governance lacks (full)
legitimacy.1 Global water governance (GWG) is a rela-
tively new phenomenon that includes water-related
international and regional rules, standards and policies
as well as institutions involved in the making, imple-
mentation and monitoring of these measures. The gov-
ernance crisis has often been ascribed to the following:
global water governance is fragmented, it is too polycen-
tric, it is too state-centred, it is not effective, it is not
inclusive, it is not fair, and so on. The article undertakes
the task to explore this alleged governance crisis in glob-
al water governance.
The crisis in global water governance will be analysed
from the perspective of two competing theories: global
constitutionalism (GC) and global administrative law
(GAL). Both schools focus on the international legal
order that exists beyond the state and address the legiti-
macy of the structures of global governance. According
to scholars linked to these schools certain (procedural/
institutional and/or substantive) arrangements are capa-
ble of enhancing the legitimacy of global governance.
While GC relies on constitutional principles such as
common values/hierarchy of norms, human rights and
separation of powers, GAL focuses on legitimacy
through transparency, participation and accountability/
judicial review. Although the ideas of both schools can
be used as analytical tools, they are inherently norma-
tive; i.e. they both imply that following their agenda a
legitimate global governance structure can be created.
The primary question of GC in this context is the fol-
lowing: to what extent is water governance constitution-
alised? The main question a GAL-perspective poses
with regard to water governance is the following: to
what extent is GWG driven by the principles of ‘good
governance’?
The respective responses to these questions will be used
to illuminate the legitimacy gaps in global water govern-
1. 6th World Water Forum, OECD Key Messages < www.oecd.org/data-
oecd/41/36/49053552.pdf> (last visited 22 October 2012); UN Secre-
tary-General, Message for World Water Day, 18 March 2011,
<www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13456.doc.htm> (last vis-
ited 22 October 2012); United Nations Water, United Nations World
Water Development Report: Water a Shared Responsibility, 2006.
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ance, simultaneously revealing the nature of the crisis
from their own perspective. The identified gaps will
subsequently be compared to explore any potential dif-
ferences between the findings of the two analyses and to
scrutinise whether and to what extent they are able to
address or mitigate the crisis in a changing world. This
article will also discuss whether reading one of the most
accepted proposals for legitimising global water govern-
ance, the concept of ‘integrated water resources man-
agement’ (IWRM), through the lenses of either GC or
GAL would have an impact on how this concept is
interpreted and applied, and whether it could offer (fur-
ther) solutions for the water crisis.
In order to achieve the above indicated purposes, the
article is structured as follows. First, a brief overview
will be provided about global water governance (sec-
tion 2) as well as the identified crisis of global water gov-
ernance (section 3). Thereafter, the actual analysis will
be carried out: first, the lenses of global constitutional-
ism (section 4), then those of global administrative law
(section 5) will be put on. Each of these analytical sec-
tions will map2 the trends in global water governance
from the perspective of these theories, discuss how these
theories might shape GWG, and last, whether shaping
GWG could contribute to solving the water crisis. Sec-
tion 6 will briefly address the concept of IWRM when
put into the context of GC and GAL. Finally, some
concluding reflections (section 7) will be made about
these looking glasses and the water crisis.
2. A Concise Overview of
Global Water Governance
It has been argued that international water law reached
the level of ‘global water law’ for the following reasons:
it ‘moved beyond the inter-state paradigm’, the role of
states has become functional as opposed to discretion-
ary, it ‘protects the interests of individuals and groups
in society’ (not merely state interests), and international
institutions ‘operate as relatively independent actors’.3
Given this development in water law and the accompa-
nying institutionalisation of transnational relations, one
can also talk about global water governance (GWG).4
Indeed, Conca also confirms that
2. The terminologies of ‘mapping’ and ‘shaping’ are borrowed from
A. Wiener, A.F. Lang JR., J. Tully, M.P. Maduro & M. Kumm, ‘Editorial:
Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of
Law’, 1 Global Constitutionalism 1, at 6-9.
3. E. Hey, ‘Distributive justice and procedural fairness in global water law’,
in J. Ebbesson and P. Okowa (eds.), Environmental Law and Justice in
Context (2009) 351, at 352.
4. According to some, the argument still needs to be made for creating
such a governance system, i.e. the existing arrangements cannot be
qualified as GWG yet. See inter alia A.Y. Hoekstra, ‘The Global Dimen-
sion of Water Governance: Nine Reasons for Global Arrangements in
Order to Cope with Local Water Problems’, Value of Water Research
Report Series no. 20, at 9 (2006).
‘[i]f global governance consists of governing acts that
have a broadly international realm, and if those acts
include such things as the framing of policy, the set-
ting of standards, and the mobilisation and allocation
of resources, then water is indeed subject to govern-
ance that is increasingly, though certainly not exclu-
sively, global’.5
This development is part of what takes place in interna-
tional environmental law in general. With regard to this
particular development it has been explained that the
recently emerging normative construct of global envi-
ronmental governance ‘encapsulates the countless (and
growing) political, legal and institutional arrangements
at the international, regional, sub-regional, national and
sub-national levels that seek to respond to environmen-
tal problems.’6 In a similar vein, global water govern-
ance could then be described as ‘the range of political,
social, economic and administrative systems that are in
place to develop and manage water resource, and the
delivery of water services, at different levels of society.’7
The historical development of international/global
water law8 and governance resulted in that it now incor-
porates different ‘dimensions’. The UN World Water
Development Report, for instance, talks about four
dimensions: ‘the economic (efficient use), environmen-
tal (sustainable use), political (equal democratic oppor-
tunities), and social (equitable use), together providing
entry and exit points for the water governance dis-
course.’9 Rather than dimensions, other scholars
describe global water governance as the compilation of
different ‘discourses’, also described as ‘Mobius web
arena of water governance’: the web made of the inter-
national law arena, the economic arena and the human
rights and policy arena.10
Accordingly, global water governance incorporates sev-
eral dimensions or discourses. Some make a distinction
based on the institutions or legal documents involved,
5. K. Conca, Governing Water. Contentious Transnational Politics and
Global Institution Building (2006), at 5.
6. L.J. Kotzé, ‘Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism’, 1 Trans-
national Environmental Law 199, at 201 (2012).
7. A Global Water Partnership paper addressing effective governance lays
down that ‘[g]overnance is about effectively implementing socially
acceptable allocation and regulation and is thus intensely political. …
The concept … encompasses laws, regulations, and institutions but also
relates to government policies and actions, to domestic activities, and to
networks of influence, including international market forces, the private
sector and civil society.’ P. Rogers and E.W. Hall, Effective Water Gov-
ernance, Global Water Partnership Technical Committee (2003), at 4.
Also quoted by P. Wouters, ‘Global Water Governance through Many
Lenses’, 14 Global Governance 523, at 529 (2008).
8. For a concise overview of this historical development see J. Gupta and
N. Sanchez, ‘Global Green Governance: Embedding the Green Economy
in a Global Green and Equitable Rule of Law Polity’, 21 Review of Euro-
pean Community and International Environmental Law 12, at 14
(2012).
9. Wouters, supra n. 8, at 530.
10. J. Gupta, R. Ahlers & L. Ahmed, ‘The Human Right to Water: Moving
Towards Consensus in a Fragmented World’, 19 Review of European
Community and International Environmental Law 294, at 295 (2010).
See also J. Blatter and H. Ingram, ‘States, Markets and Beyond: Govern-
ance of Transboundary Water Resources’ 40 Natural Resources Journal
339, at 447 (2000).
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others focus on the subject matter addressed by particu-
lar institutions or legal documents. This development in
global water law probably stems from the fact that water
can be seen as an ecological, economic and social/
human unit.11 The existing instruments seem to reflect
these three main features of water: the so-called water
conventions regard water mainly as an ecological unit
(ecological cluster), the approach of the World Bank to
water deals with water as an economic unit (economic
cluster), and the rather recent acknowledgment at the
UN level of the human right to water seems to regard
water as a ‘social/human’ unit (social justice cluster). As
will be shown below, there are certain overlaps between
these clusters, but in general each follows its own dis-
course and focus.
These different discourses also mean that water is not
governed from a central location. An attempt was made
to coordinate the different activities relating to water by
the establishment of UN Water in 2003.12 UN Water,
however, is merely a coordinating organ without any
power to make decisions.13 The explicit aim with the
creation of this body was to ‘provide a platform for sys-
tem-wide discussions’.14 Remarkably, an increasingly
important concept in water law, that is ‘integrated water
resources management’ (IWRM), also emphasises the
importance of creating a platform where coordination
could take place. IWRM is defined as ‘a process which
promotes the coordinated development and manage-
ment of water, land and related resources in order to
maximise economic and social welfare in an equitable
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital
ecosystems and the environment.’15 The very idea of
IWRM originates from the recognition that the various
forms of water uses are interdependent given that they
rely on the same resource.
The global water governance system will be discussed
along the lines of the above-mentioned three clusters.
Although there are certain overlaps between these clus-
ters, as indicated above, the main focus of the instru-
ments/institutions discussed still justifies their discus-
sion along these dimensions.
The ecological cluster includes the following main
instruments: Convention on the Law of the Non-navi-
11. For an interesting approach on the re-definition on water supply see
R. Uruena, ‘Expertise and Global Water Governance: How to Start
Thinking about Power over Water Resources?’, 9 Anuario Mexicano de
Derecho Internacional 117 (2009).
12. The Global Water Partnership (GWP) could also be mentioned as a
rather overarching organisation. On this network and institution, see
E. Fromageau, ‘The Global Water Partnership: Between Institutional
Flexibility and Legal Legitimacy’, 8 International Organizations Law
Review 367 (2011).
13. Gupta, Ahlers & Ahmed, supra n. 11, at 298.
14. <www.unwater.org/v2_08/discover.html> (last visited 22 October
2012). UN Water’s key responsibilities are monitoring and reporting on
the progress to achieve water and sanitation MDGs targets.
15. <www.gwp.org/The-Challenge/What-is-IWRM> (last visited 22 Octo-
ber 2012) (emphasis added). Global Water Partnership was established
with the aim to ‘support the sustainable development and management
of water resources at all levels’ and ‘to foster integrated water resources
management’. <www.gwp.org/en/About-GWP> (last visited 22 Octo-
ber 2012). See also Fromageau, supra n. 13, at 367-368, 376-377.
gational Uses of International Watercourses (1997 Con-
vention)16 (even though not in force yet), the Conven-
tion on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki Con-
vention),17 its two Protocols (Helsinki Protocol I18 and
Helsinki Protocol II),19 and the 2008 International Law
Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on the Law of Trans-
boundary Aquifers.20 Given that the Draft Articles fol-
low to a great extent the 1997 UN Watercourse Conven-
tion, it will not be separately discussed, only the relevant
articles will be indicated. The main purpose or focus of
these instruments is the protection of waters, and envi-
ronment in general – hence, its categorisation as ecologi-
cal cluster. In addition to these legal documents, several
treaties on the protection of transboundary rivers have
also been adopted, and river basin organisations have
been created, which, however, are not included in this
article.
The economic cluster consists of the World Bank (WB)
and its policies. An important segment (12%) of the
World Bank lending projects are related to water in
one way or another.21 In addition to its Operational Pol-
icies,22 the WB also adopted the Water Resources Sector
Strategy in 2004 to guide the Bank’s assistance in water-
related projects,23 and in 2010 the World Bank Group
Implementation Progress Report of the Water Resour-
ces Sector Strategy was issued.24 The main focus of the
economic cluster is on the efficient allocation of resour-
ces as well as efficient use of water.
Finally, the social justice cluster addresses the human
right to water and the importance of water for develop-
16. Adopted on 21 May 1997, <http://untreaty.un. org/ilc/texts/instru-
ments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf> (last visited 22 Oct. 2012).
17. Adopted on 17 March 1992, <www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/
water/pdf/watercon. pdf> (last visited 22 October 2012).
18. Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protec-
tion and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,
adopted on 17 June 1999, <www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/
documents/2000/wat/mp.wat.2000.1.e.pdf> (last visited 22 October
2012).
19. Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters
to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on
the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, adopted on 21 May
2003, <www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/civil-liability/documents/
protocol_e.pdf> (last visited 22 October 2012).
20. <http://untreaty.un. org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20arti-
cles/8_5_2008.pdf> (last visited 22 October 2012).
21. <web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:
21790401~menuPK:5119395~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:
40941,00.html> (last visited 22 October 2012).
22. Operational Policies, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,menuPK:
64701763~pagePK:64719906~piPK:64710996~theSitePK:
502184,00.html> (last visited 22 October 2012).
23. World Bank, Water Resources Sector Strategy: Strategic Directions for
World Bank Engagement, 2004, <http://water.worldbank.org/publica-
tions/water-resources-sector-strategy-strategic-directions-world-bank-
engagement> (last visited 22 October 2012).
24. World Bank, Sustaining Water for All in a Changing Climate, 2010,
<http://water.worldbank.org/publications/sustaining-water-all-chang-
ing-climate-world-bank-group-implementation-progress-report> (last
visited 22 October 2012).
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ment. The most relevant instruments25 are the follow-
ing: General Comment 15 of the Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) on the
human right to water26 and the United Nations Millen-
nium Declaration27 as well as the documents resulting
from the conferences leading up to28 and following
upon29 the adoption of these Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). It was not until 2003 that the independ-
ent human right to water was acknowledged by the
CESCR in the above mentioned general comment. Ear-
lier it was considered being dependent of other rights or
being implicit therein. The developmental goals do not
explicitly mention the right to water, rather they set pol-
icy targets that need to be attained. While equally
important, a distinction is often made between the
so-called rights-discourse and the developmental-dis-
course, the former being more legally enforceable. Nev-
ertheless, in both cases the focus is on the individual
who should have access to water and the need to achieve
social justice by appropriate allocation of the scarce
water resources.
3. Crisis of Global Water
Governance
The alleged crisis of global water governance can be
located in the broader framework of legitimacy of global
governance. Traditionally, states were the subjects of
international law even where some forms of public pow-
er were ‘delegated’ to an international decision-maker.
Under traditional international law global governance
was regarded as performing the states’ will. States nee-
ded to give their consent to the decisions made at the
international level, states were the addressees of these
decisions, and states could ask for review in case of a
dispute. States being the subjects of international law
also meant that in traditional international law the exer-
cise of public power at the international level gained
legitimacy through the participation of states.
25. See also The European Charter on Water Resources, para. 5, adopted
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommenda-
tion (2001)14, 17 October 2001; Art. 14(2) of the 1979 Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), adopted 16 December 1979, in force 3 September 1981;
and Art. 24(2) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child,
adopted 20 November 1989, in force 2 September 1990. CEDAW con-
ceives of the right to water as part of the right to enjoy adequate living
conditions for women living in rural areas; the Convention on the Rights
of the Child as part of the right to health.
26. CESCR General Comment 15(2002), ‘The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights)’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, [hereinafter Gen-
eral Comment 15].
27. General Assembly Resolution 55/2, adopted on 8 September 2000,
<www.un. org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm> (last visited
22 October 2012).
28. The 1977 United Nations Water Conference, the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, and the 1994 United
Nations International Conference on Population and Development.
29. The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration and Plan of Implementation and
the 2005 World Summit Outcome.
However, currently the exercise of public power at the
global level has been undergoing certain important
changes as an effect of globalisation, privatisation and
de-nationalisation. Unlike in traditional international
law, institutions or private actors operating at the global
level increasingly exercise certain forms of public power
in a way that directly affects non-state actors. The series
of Kadi (and related) cases relating to the UN Security
Council’s listing of individuals and entities associated
with terrorist organisations are, among others, illustra-
tive of this phenomenon.30 This increasing exercise of
public power in structures of global governance raises
fundamental questions as to the legitimacy of global
governance, i.e. whether, to what extent and how this
authority is and can be justified and accepted.31
Global water governance itself has also been argued to
suffer from legitimacy deficiencies, also as a conse-
quence of these changes at the global level, which con-
tributed to or has led to water crisis. In general, three
main reasons have been given for the water crisis. First,
as indicated above, global water law incorporates differ-
ent actors operating at different levels with different
focuses/perspectives. Accordingly, this field has been
described as ‘diffuse and fragmented’.32 This characteris-
tic of global water governance has also led to the obser-
vation that GWG lacks clear rules of procedure,33 and
thus decisions are made in an ad hoc and inconsistent
manner. Such governance, so the argument generally
goes, cannot be regarded as either legitimate or efficient.
Second, and relating to the fragmented nature of global
water governance, diverging criticisms have been
uttered in relation to the different clusters of global
water governance. For instance, the economic cluster
has been criticised for focusing too much on cost-
efficiency and losing sight of social justice elements;34
the ecological cluster for being too state-centred and
thus not recognising interests of groups and
individuals;35 and the social justice cluster for lacking
appropriate enforcement mechanisms for environmental
rights.36
Third, it has been argued that global water governance
does not address the two main factors of water crisis,
that is (1) increasing demand meeting with decreasing
30. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union,
[2008] ECR I-6351.
31. D. Bodansky, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law’, Univer-
sity of Georgia School of Law Research Paper No. 07-013, at 1 (2007).
Compare with the definitions by W. Hinsch, ‘Legitimacy and Justice: A
Conceptual and Functional Clarification’, in J. Kühnelt (ed.), Political
Legitimization without Morality? (2008) 39, at 39 and 51; T.M. Franck,
Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), at 7-8.
32. Gupta and Sanchez, supra n. 9, at 14 (emphasis added).
33. Ibid.
34. For a brief explanation of this debate see, inter alia, A.K. Biswas, ‘An
Assessment of Future Global Water Issues’, 21 International Journal of
Water Resources Development 229, at 234 (2005); Gupta, Ahlers &
Ahmed, supra n. 11, at 299, Hey, supra n. 4, at 365.
35. Hey, supra n. 4, at 353.
36. J. Gupta, ‘The Current Status of the Human Right to Water’, in
M.R. van der Valk and P. Keenan (eds.), The Right to Water and Water
Rights in a Changing World (2011) 47 at 52.
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supply both in terms of water quantity and water quali-
ty, which is mainly a question of water allocation; and
(2) climate change having impact on water resources,
which relates to how governance deals with unpredicta-
bility and uncertainty.37
Given these criticisms and observations, the attention
will now turn to how global constitutionalism and global
administrative law describe this crisis, and whether their
respective responses could address the above-mentioned
critical points, and thus contribute to solving and/or
mitigating the water crisis.
4. Through the Looking Glass
of Global Constitutionalism
The legal, political science and international relations
literature is quite rich on the constitutionalisation of
international law and international governance in gener-
al, or of a specific field thereof. Global constitutionalism
has, famously, been referred to as a ‘mindset’ by Kos-
kenniemi.38 In this sense, GC is said to provide ‘a
vocabulary of institutional hierarchies and fundamental
values in the application of law’.39 This vocabulary gen-
erally consists of the following constitutional elements:
common or shared values and hierarchy of norms (also
called the rule of law), protection of fundamental rights,
and guidelines for relations between different actors,
and in particular interstate relations (checks and balan-
ces).40
Depending on the approach the particular authors have
taken, several categories of global constitutionalism or
constitutionalisation have been created: legal process,
subjectification, objectification; mapping and shaping;
substantive and formalistic; substantive and procedural;
modern constitutionalism, constitutionalism beyond
state and postmodern constitutionalism; and so on.41
Some use constitutionalisation to show the extent to
which traces of constitutionalisation can be discovered,
to show the trends in the light of this theory; others
rather explicitly argue for a more robust constitutionali-
sation of the international/global arena in order to
ensure more accountability of the entities exercising
37. See, inter alia, C. Bruch and J. Troell, ‘Legalizing Adaptation: Water
Law in a Changing Climate’, 36 Water International 828, at 830; Gupta
and Sanchez, supra n. 11, at 12; Hey, supra n. 4, at 351-352.
38. M. Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian
Themes about International Law and Globalization’, 8 Theoretical
Inquiries in Law 9 (2007).
39. A. Cardesa-Salzmann, ‘Constitutionalising Secondary Rules in Global
Environmental Regimes: Non-Compliance Procedures and the Enforce-
ment of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, 24 Journal of Environ-
mental Law 103, at 107 (2012).
40. See inter alia, A. Peters and K. Armingeon, ‘Introduction – Global Con-
stitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective’, 16 Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies 385, at 38 (2009); K. Milewicz, ‘Emerging Pat-
terns of Global Constitutionalization: Toward a Conceptual Framework’,
16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 413, at 422 (2009).
41. For a general overview see, e.g., J. Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’, in
J. Klabbers, A. Peters & G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of Inter-
national Law (2009) 1.
public power and thus enhance their legitimacy. Even
though such distinction might conceptually be made,
there is an inherent normative element in such analyses:
increased constitutionalisation is needed42 in order to
limit the unilateral approaches of states, in particular
where a common or collective approach is needed to
tackle a problem, such as climate change or water scarci-
ty. Unsurprisingly, the claim for constitutionalising
international water law has also been made as a response
to the ‘water crisis’.43
Given this framework, the next section will first (1)
explore the signs of constitutionalisation in each cluster
separately (exploring). Based on this exploration, a com-
parative section will (2) map the extent to which global
water governance is constitutionalised (mapping),
(3) assess how further constitutionalisation would shape
global water governance (shaping), and (4) whether such
shaping would contribute to solving the water crisis
(solving)?
As constitutionalisation is a rather complex process and
thus impossible to address in this article, the present
analysis will try to capture its main substantive fea-
tures44 and explore whether and to what extent they can
be traced in the different clusters.45 These features46 are
the following:
1. To what extent is there a set of common values that
might be considered higher norms that trumps other
values, that penetrate through the whole system, that
inform other law?
2. To what extent is attention devoted to individuals and
vulnerable groups of society in order to ensure the pro-
tection of human rights, human dignity, equality and
solidarity?
42. Dunoff and Trachtman argue that ‘[a] number of contemporary devel-
opments contribute to the demand for international constitutionaliza-
tion. ’ J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to Inter-
national Constitutionalization’, in J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.),
Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global
Governance (2009) 3, at 5.
43. Gupta and Sanchez, supra n. 9, at 13. The same argument was also
raised with regard to global environmental governance in general. See,
inter alia, L.J. Kotzé, ‘Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism’,
1 Transnational Environmental Law 199, at 202 (2012).
44. The choice of focusing on ’substantive’ rules of GC might imply a par-
ticular interpretation of constitutionalism. This choice was, however,
influenced by a more practical reason, namely the less ambivalent and
more coherent approach chosen by GAL-theorists to explicitly focus on
procedural questions. Accordingly, in order to be able to show the dif-
ferent approaches used by these schools, ‘only’ the substantive rules are
included in the GC-analysis without the intent to favour any theory of
constitutionalism. Increasingly, the GC scholarly works include GAL as
part of GC.
45. Due to the limited space, only the legal rules will be put in spotlight,
and the actual application of these principles will not be addressed here.
46. For a somewhat different approach see Dunoff and Trachtman, supra
n. 43, at 18-22.
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3. How do relevant instruments limit the actors’ power,
i.e. what type of checks and balances mechanisms are
built in?47
4.1. Exploring the Traces of
Constitutionalisation in the Clusters
4.1.1.  The Ecological Cluster
• Common Values
Several common values can be discovered in the ecolog-
ical cluster. One of the core values is equitable and rea-
sonable utilisation48 of water resources.49 Although sepa-
rately mentioned, this principle also incorporates the
need for optimal and sustainable utilisation50 as well as
economically sound and rational water resources manage-
ment.51 Both the 1997 Convention and the Helsinki
Convention adopt a ‘holistic view’ on water resources as
well as environment, and based on this they lay down
the obligation to rely on the so-called ecosystem
approach.52 According to McIntyre, ‘[t]he ecosystem
approach has been closely linked to the concept of sus-
tainable development, which is central to the notion of
equitable utilisation.’53 The explicit focus on future gen-
erations54 in the Helsinki Convention can also be linked
to the concept of equitable utilisation on the one hand,
and sustainable development on the other. Interestingly,
the first mention of the need for integrated water re-
sources management, a concept that has been linked to
47. This feature is closely related to accountability that is discussed under
the GAL perspective. The focus here is on the manner the power of the
actors is constituted and constrained through institutional or other
arrangements, while the accountability aspect discusses the possible
ways through which access to justice can be ensured and compliance
with the obligations enshrined in the different clusters can be moni-
tored/supervised. Put differently, the ‘checks and balances’ aspect is
concerned with the way the public power is exercised in the broader
sense, and the ‘accountability’ angle concentrates on the enforcement
of obligations.
48. McIntyre has argued that ‘[e]quitable utilization is the primary substan-
tive principle of international water law’. O. McIntyre, ‘The Emergence
of an “Ecosystem Approach” to the Protection of International Water-
courses under International Law’, 13 Review of European Community
and International Environmental Law 1, at 10 (2004). See also Arts. 5
and 6 of the 1997 Convention.
49. Art. 5 of the 1997 Convention; Art. 2(2)(c) of the Helsinki Convention;
Art. 4 of the 2008 Draft Articles.
50. Art. 5 of the 1997 Convention.
51. Art. 2(2)(b) of the Helsinki Convention. McIntyre argued that ‘the over-
riding objective of sustainable development, requiring a balancing of
economic and environmental objectives, is usually acknowledged’.
McIntyre, supra n. 49, at 10.
52. Arts. 2(a), 6 and 20 of the 1997 Convention; Arts. 2(2)(d) and 2(4) of
the Helsinki Convention; Arts. 5 and 10 of the 2008 Draft Articles. See
also Art. 4(2)(c) of the Helsinki Protocol I.
53. McIntyre, supra n. 49, at 10.
54. Art. 2(5)(c) of the Helsinki Convention. See also Art. 5(d) of the Helsinki
Protocol I.
sustainability and ecosystem management, has only been
made in the Helsinki Protocol I in 1999.55
Another important principle in the 1997 Convention is
the principle of ‘no significant harm’, enshrined in its
Article 7. Although ‘[t]he relationship between the prin-
ciples of equitable utilisation and no significant harm
has generated much discussion’,56 it seems accepted that
the former has primacy over the latter.57 Opposed to the
‘no significant harm’ approach, the Helsinki Convention
relies on the precautionary principle,58 which is generally
recognised as creating a lower threshold due to the
uncertainty element embraced therein,59 and thus being
more favourable for the environment. Although the pre-
cautionary principle has been linked to the polluter pays
principle,60 the latter still constitutes an important prin-
ciple of this cluster.61
Finally, the obligation to co-operate can also be identi-
fied as an overarching or common principle both in the
1997 and the Helsinki Conventions.62
• Individuals and Vulnerable Groups
Concerning this segment of the ecological cluster, the
1997 Convention signifies a remarkable lack of (direct)
attention to the needs and wishes of individuals/groups.
The Convention has been criticised for not establishing
a more straightforward priority in terms of the use of
international watercourses.63 Pursuant to Article 10 of
the 1997 Convention, when there is a conflict between
the uses, the principle of equitable and reasonable uti-
lisation should serve as guidance in resolving it ‘with
special regard being given to the requirements of vital
55. Art. 4(1) of the Helsinki Protocol I: ‘[t]he Parties shall take all appropri-
ate measures to prevent, control and reduce water-related disease with-
in a framework of integrated water-management system aimed at sus-
tainable use of water resources, ambient water quality which does not
endanger human health, and protection of water ecosystems.’See also
Art. 5(j) Protocol I: ‘[w]ater resources should, as far as possible, be man-
aged in an integrated manner on the basis of catchment areas, with the
aims of linking social and economic development to the to the protec-
tion of natural ecosystems and of relating water-resource management
to regulatory measures concerning other environmental mediums.’
56. E. Hey, ‘The Watercourses Convention: To What Extent Does it Provide
a Basis for Regulating Uses of International Watercourses?’, 7 Review
of European Community and International Environmental Law 291, at
294 (1998).
57. See, inter alia, O. McIntyre, Environmental Protection of International
Watercourses under International Law (2007), at 185; S.M.A. Salman,
‘The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin
Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law’, 23 Water Resources
Development 625, at 633 (2007).
58. Art. 2(5)b) of the Helsinki Convention. See also Art. 5(a) of the Helsinki
Protocol I.
59. On the uncertainty ‘leg’ of the precautionary principle, see A. Trouw-
borst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (2006), at 71-120.
60. M. Fitzmaurice, D.M. Ong & P. Merkouris (eds.), Research Handbook
on International Environmental Law (2010), at 203. The authors
argued that ‘the mere fact that the potential polluters are expected to
take responsibility for their actions can be viewed as encouraging a for-
ward-looking approach that includes a degree of precaution.’ Ibid.,
at 204.
61. Art. 2(5)(b) of the Helsinki Convention. See also Art. 5(b) of the Helsin-
ki Protocol I.
62. Art. 8 1997 Convention; Art. 9 of the Helsinki Convention.
63. Hey, supra n. 57, at 293.
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human needs.’64 Nevertheless, the Convention emphasis-
es in the Preamble that the Parties are ‘[a]ware of the
special situation and needs of developing countries’,
which might be interpreted as requiring some special
attention to those in a vulnerable situation in developing
countries.
Somewhat differently, the Helsinki Protocol I prescribes
that ‘[t]he Parties shall … take all appropriate measures
for the purpose of ensuring … [a]dequate supplies of
wholesome drinking water which is free from any
micro-organisms, parasites and substances’.65 Although
it does not address the other uses of water, the concen-
tration on drinking water still seems to establish a clear
priority for vital human needs. In addition, this Protocol
also enshrines that ‘[e]quitable access to water, adequate
in terms both of quantity and of quality, should be pro-
vided for all members of the population, especially those
who suffer a disadvantage or social exclusion’.66 This
provision not only envisages a priority of water use, it
also requires that special attention is devoted to those
being in a marginalised position. In addition, a particu-
lar group of marginalised groups is highlighted when the
Protocol lays down that ‘[s]pecial consideration should
be given to the protection of people who are particularly
vulnerable to water-related disease’.67
Finally, the individual seems to be put in the fore-
ground in the Helsinki Protocol II, the aim of which is
‘to provide for a comprehensive regime for civil liability
and for adequate and prompt compensation for damage
caused by the transboundary effects of industrial acci-
dents on transboundary waters.’68 Although this Proto-
col does not address legal standing questions in terms of
the applicant, when ‘damage’ is defined, it includes
effects on individuals and/or groups. Moreover, the fact
that this Protocol concerns ‘civil liability’ also puts the
emphasis on individuals and/or groups who can file
their civil complaint against the operator.
(3) Checks and Balances
Cooperation as an overarching principle has already been
mentioned above, but it is definitely also a form of
checks and balances, and in this cluster the main form of
constituting and constraining the power of the state par-
ties. Based on the 1997 Convention, this cooperation can
take different forms: cooperation in general concerning
‘the regulation of the flow of the waters’,69 the establish-
ment of joint (management) mechanisms or commissions to
facilitate cooperation and management of an interna-
64. Art. 10(2) of the 1997 Convention (emphasis added); Art. 5(2) of the
2008 Draft Articles.
65. Art. 4(2)(a) of the Helsinki Protocol I.
66. Art. 5(l) of the Helsinki Protocol I.
67. Art. 5(k) of the Helsinki Protocol I.
68. Art. 1 of the Helsinki Protocol II (emphasis added).
69. Art. 25 of the 1997 Convention. ‘Watercourse States shall cooperate,
where appropriate, to respond to needs or opportunities for regulation
of the flow of the waters of an international watercourse.’
tional watercourse,70 taking measures jointly to protect
and preserve the ecosystems71 or exchange information in
relation to planned measures.72
Similarly to the 1997 Convention, the Helsinki Conven-
tion and its Protocol I also require the cooperation of
states, both between all states and between riparian
states. All states are required to cooperate concerning
‘monitoring the conditions of transboundary waters’,73
and ‘research into and development of effective techni-
ques for the prevention, control and reduction of trans-
boundary impact’.74 In addition, riparian states are
required to ‘enter into bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments or other arrangements … in order to define their
… conduct regarding the prevention, control and reduc-
tion of transboundary impact.’75 For this purpose they
also need to establish joint bodies as well as joint pro-
grammes for monitoring the conditions of transboundary
waters. The Helsinki Convention as well as its Protocol
I also establish the meeting of parties, where ‘the Parties
shall keep under continuous review the implementation
of this Convention’.76
4.1.2. The Economic Cluster
• Common Values and Principles
In the World Bank’s water-related documents, there are
certain recurring values and principles, which can
actually be divided along the lines of the three clusters.
The fact that the World Bank includes, to a certain
extent, each dimension of water, implies that it, indeed,
aims to apply a holistic or integrated approach. The
World Bank’s documents indicate that there has been,
even though implicit, a shift from regarding water as an
economic good77 to water as a public good (or some-
times regional public good)78 in the World Bank’s
approach. Arguably, this shift has also had a role to play
in the Bank’s advancing the inclusion of these three
dimensions in its approach to water.79 So the implicit
70. Art. 8(2) of the 1997 Convention. Art. 8(2) of the 1997 Convention
enshrines that ‘watercourse states may consider the establishment of
joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary by them, to
facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light
of experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms
and commissions in various regions’ (emphasis added). See also
Art. 24(1) of the 1997 Convention; Arts, 7(2) and 14 of the 2008 Draft
Articles.
71. Arts. 20 and 27 of the 1997 Convention; A Art. 12 of the 2008 Draft
Articles.
72. Art. 11 of the 1997 Convention; Art. 15 of the 2008 Draft Articles.
73. Art. 4 of the 1997 Convention.
74. Art. 5 of the Helsinki Convention; Arts. 11 and 13 of the Helsinki Proto-
col I.
75. Arts. 2(6) and 9 of the Helsinki Convention.
76. Art. 17 of the Helsinki Convention; Art. 16 of the Helsinki Protocol I.
77. See, inter alia, Gupta, Ahlers & Ahmed, supra n. 11, at 299.
78. ‘As water transcends political boundaries, it becomes a regional public
good for which collective action can secure sustainable win-win bene-
fits.’ World Bank Group Implementation Progress Report of the Water
Resource Sector Strategy: Sustaining Water for All in a Changing Cli-
mate [hereinafter Sustaining Water for All] (2010), at 39 (emphasis
added).
79. ‘The nature of water as a fundamental public good makes its control
and management a sensitive political economy issue’, Sustaining Water
for All, at 7.
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acknowledgement of water as a public good might be
regarded as the first, and overarching, value establishing
the linkages among the clusters.
Concerning the ecological aspect of water, the Water
Resources Sector Strategy (2004) as well as the World
Bank Group Implementation Progress Report of the
Water Resources Sector Strategy (2010) explicitly point
to the need to adopt a holistic approach, to rely on the
concept of integrated water resources management. Start-
ing in the Sector Strategy, ‘[t]his integrated water
resources management … framework changed the vision
for the sector and provided the basis for moving away
from a sector-based investment focus to a multi-sectoral
approach to planning.’80 Nevertheless the Progress
Report acknowledged that ‘[t]he integration of resource
management has occurred mostly among water sub-
sectors and less between the water sector and other sec-
tors.’81
Other related principles, which are often also seen as
embedded in the IWRM approach, are sustainable devel-
opment, focus on resilience, climate change mitigation, and
future generations.82 These principles are used as direct-
ing the Bank’s project management.83
In addition to the ecological focus, the World Bank’s
strategy also incorporates principles relating to the
human rights or social dimension of water management
and the water sector. An important aim of the Bank is to
reduce poverty and to comply with the related Millen-
nium Development Goals. ‘An overriding thrust of the
World Bank’s work on water and sanitation is to ensure
that poor people gain access to safe, affordable water
supply and sanitation services by reducing costs and
increasing accountability.’84 Very remarkably, the Sec-
tor Strategy highlights water rights several times, and
explains that ‘[r]ecognising and managing water rights is
as essential for managing irrigation systems as for man-
aging river basins or aquifers. … water rights (of indi-
viduals and communities, including traditional users)
80. Ibid., at 16. ‘Coordination between development and management of
water, land and other resources took center stage in the thinking about
water, on the basis that it would be a necessary condition to maximise
the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner with-
out compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems. IWRM is regard-
ed as critical for sustainable outcomes, and increasingly viewed as offer-
ing the best available frameworks for building the resilience needed to
adapt to climate change.’
81. Ibid., at 24.
82. See e.g. World Bank Group Water Resources Sector Strategy: Strategic
Directions for World Bank Engagement [hereinafter Water Resources
Sector Strategy] (2004) at 17, 20-21; ibid., at 4, 16.
83. Sustaining Water for All, at 4. ‘Water resource management must fol-
low a sustainable development path that achieves human well-being
without exceeding the earth’s capacities for natural resource generation
and waste absorption. The challenge is to manage the social, political,
and institutional processes of balancing the water use of present gener-
ations with the needs of future generations.’
84. Water Resources Sector Strategy, at 18.
enjoy the same legal certainty as land and other property
rights.’85
Finally, the most outstanding aspects of water manage-
ment are the economic-related principles. Two main
common values can be discerned here: efficient manage-
ment and cost efficiency (water pricing). An important
facet of efficiency is the involvement of the private sector
in the financing and managing of water resources.86 In
this context the so-called ‘principled pragmatic
approach’ deserves mentioning. This approach focuses
on the costs while taking into account the context in
which the reform takes place.87 Significant sections are
devoted to pricing and cost calculation in these docu-
ments.
• Individuals and Vulnerable Groups
There is reference and attention to certain individuals
and/or groups both in the Bank’s water-related docu-
ments and safeguard policies. As mentioned above, the
management of water resources and services is impor-
tant for the Bank not only in terms of strict cost-effi-
ciency, but also in terms of reducing poverty and thus
improving the position of the poor. For instance, the
Sector Strategy makes clear that priority is given to
access to water services of the poor.88 ‘[B]ecause it is
usually poor people who inhabit degraded landscapes,
poverty-targeted water resources interventions designed
to improve catchment quality and provide livelihoods
for poor people are of major importance.’89 In addition,
in the operation policies of the Bank, thus relating to all
its projects, the so-called project affected people90 as well
85. Ibid., at 16. The Strategy further explains that: ‘[t]his is not to suggest
that there is unanimity on the concept of water rights, for some see this
as an unhealthy commodification of a public good. Nor is it meant to
imply that it is simple to introduce rights-based systems for a fugitive
resource with deep cultural implications in administratively weak envi-
ronments. Nonetheless, there has been substantial progress in recent
years (in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and South Africa), and there are pressures
from the local level (villagers who have stored rainwater in Rajasthan,
for instance) to the international level (between the United States and
Mexico, for example) to define the rights to use an ever-scarcer
resource. The World Bank is gaining practical experience in the legal
and administrative machinery for setting up and managing rights-based
systems of water management.’ Ibid., at 16.
86. ‘Financing for water resources infrastructure is not cleanly separable
into public and private sectors; increasingly, it requires public-private
partnerships, both in investment and operation. While private invest-
ment and management are playing, and must play, a growing role, this
must take place within a publicly established long-term development
and legal and regulatory framework, and without crowding out com-
munity-managed infrastructure and beneficiary participation in design
and management of water systems. Attracting private investment into
low-income countries is particularly important and necessarily a major
focus for institutions like the World Bank.’ Ibid., at 12.
87. ‘In some areas of institutional reforms, such as water pricing and water
rights, the Bank has followed a “principled pragmatic approach” – prin-
cipled because economic principles ensure that users take financial and
resource costs into account when using water, and pragmatic because
“solutions need to be tailored to specific, widely varying natural, cultur-
al, economic, and political circumstances in which the art of reform is
the art of the possible.”’ Sustaining Water for All, at 31. See also Water
Resources Sector Strategy, at 22-25.
88. Water Resources Sector Strategy, at 24.
89. Ibid., at 2.
90. See also ibid., at 77.
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as indigenous people91 enjoy a particular position: in order
to protect their interests, they are involved in the deci-
sion-making procedure relating to the project, and they
have the right to file a complaint to the Inspection Panel
if they become victim of non-compliance with the
Bank’s policies.
• Checks and Balances
With regard to this constitutional ambit, a distinction
needs to be made between those constraining arrange-
ments that are applicable to the Bank itself and those
that the Bank imposes on its clients in its project. While
the former relate to the Bank’s general institutional set-
up and the guiding principles in its policy-making, the
latter focuses on the institutional requirements of the
Bank from states and the Bank’s relationship with its
clients in water-related projects. Given the limited
space, here only the water-specific arrangements of both
aspects are introduced.
In order to be able to comply with the integrated
approach it subscribes to, the Bank created an overarch-
ing water unit. First in 1993, the Global Water Unit was
set up, which was replaced by the Water Resources Man-
agement Group in 2000. This change was found necessa-
ry because of ‘the growing consensus that water re-
sources was emerging as a critical development issue
and with the understanding that greater coordination
across units working on water was vital.’92 This Group
was later ‘consolidated with the Water Supply and Sani-
tation Sector Board’,93 and the Water Sector Board was
established. The establishment of this board has made it
possible for the Bank to actually have an overview about
all the water-related activities within one unit. Also, the
World Bank Sustainable Development Network (SDN)94
was created in 2007 in order to ‘think and deliver in a
more integrated way, ensuring that Bank actions are
anchored by a commitment to sustainable develop-
ment.’95 The Progress Report acknowledges that ‘[t]he
adoption of an integrated approach has been a challenge
throughout the institution’.96 In addition and relating to
the changes that take place both in the environment in
general and as an effect of climate change in particular,
the Sector Strategy Report and the Progress Report pay
special attention to the need for the World Bank to be
91. See also ibid., at 77-78. The World Bank Operational Policy 4.12 [here-
inafter OP], para. 8 lays down the following: ‘[t]o achieve the objectives
of this policy, particular attention is paid to the needs of vulnerable
groups among those displaced, especially those below the poverty line,
the landless, the elderly, women and children, indigenous peoples, eth-
nic minorities, or other displaced persons who may not be protected
through national land compensation legislation. ’
92. Water Resources Sector Strategy, at 50.
93. Sustainable Water for All, at 19.
94. ‘The Sustainable Development Network (SDN) at the World Bank is re-





95. Ibid., at 19.
96. Ibid.
flexible.97 The Progress Report emphasises that ‘the
external environment is rapidly evolving and the water
agenda is becoming more complex, requiring the WBG
to be flexible and responsive to new challenges and
opportunities.’98
Concerning the second aspect of this constitutional
ambit, the Sector Strategy observes that the client coun-
tries ‘face major challenges in developing the laws, regu-
lations and institutions required for managing water
resources in a more economically productive, socially
acceptable and environmentally sustainable fashion.’99
In the Bank’s view clients need to realise that water
management is beyond boundaries, it requires cooperation,
and it requires public-private partnerships. In addition,
certain projects might even require changes in the gov-
ernance structure, given the need for the integrated
approach. In the WB’s view, [a]n important constraint
for implementing an integrated approach has been the
governance structure in client countries.’100
4.1.3. The Social Justice Cluster
• Common Values
An overarching principle of this cluster is that water is
seen as a public good, more specifically, as a social and
cultural good (as opposed to economic good).101 This
view on water also has effect on water uses: the relevant
documents clearly define the priority of uses – ‘[t]he
human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient,
safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable
water for personal and domestic uses.’102 The priority
for domestic and personal uses is also implied in the
acknowledgement that ‘[t]he right to water clearly falls
within the category of guarantees essential for securing
an adequate standard of living, particularly since it is
one of the most fundamental conditions for survival.’103
The same can also be observed in the GA resolution on
the human right to water104 as well as in the GA Millen-
nium Declaration.105
97. One of the lessons that the Bank has learned based on the projects that
were included in the assessment report is that ‘it is important to address
institutional objectives in the context of long-term programmatic
engagements, rather than individual projects’. Ibid., at 60.
98. Ibid., at xii.
99. Water Resources Sector Strategy, at 11.
100. Sustainable Water for All, at 26. The Progress Report also explains that
‘[w]hile institutional settings and governance structure of most client
countries do not encourage integrated planning, development and
management of water resources, it will remain critical for the Bank to
support a holistic dialogue with client countries on water issues.’ Sus-
tainable Water for All, at 57.
101. General Comment 15, para. 11.
102. Ibid., para. 2.
103. Ibid., para. 3.
104. ‘Acknowledging the importance of equitable, safe and clean drinking
water and sanitation as an integral component of the realization of all
human rights.’ GA Res. 64/292, The human right to water and sanita-
tion [hereinafter GA Human right to water and sanitation], 3 August
2010, Preamble.
105. ‘… to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to
afford safe drinking water.’ GA Res 55/2. United Nations Millennium
Declaration [hereinafter GA Millennium Declaration], 8 September
2000, para. 19.
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In addition, each related document also puts an empha-
sis on sufficient, safe and affordable drinking water. While
the economic cluster paid particular attention to cost-
efficiency, this cluster can be seen as placing a minimum
requirement on the cost-efficiency thinking – that is the
affordability of drinking water. Interestingly, these qual-
ifications (affordability and drinking) make the cost-cal-
culation relative, and might allow for distinctions to be
made among individuals as well as among water uses in
water-pricing. Such distinctions, given the inherent dif-
ferences among these aspects, might be justified on the
basis of substantive equality, which seem to pervade not
only this financial side, but the whole system, of human
right to water, making the idea of equality a foundation-
al aspect thereof. General Comment 15 and the Millen-
nium Declaration place the access to water within the
broader framework of sustainability/environmental pro-
tection at the same time emphasising the need to focus
on future generations.106 Finally, it is important to note
that General Comment 15 identifies some important
‘core obligations’, which are very useful given the broad
scope of the right to water as well as the obligation of
progressive realisation in general for economic, social
and cultural rights. These core obligations require
immediate action, and are based on the normative con-
tent of the right to water, an important element of which
is that ‘[t]he elements of the right to water must be ade-
quate for human dignity, life and health’.107
• Individuals and Vulnerable Groups
Unlike the other clusters, the human rights cluster
explicitly concentrates on individuals and groups, and in
particular those being in vulnerable position (poor and
marginalised).108 Again, this attention to the vulnerable
originates from the principle of equality. The General
Comment explains that ‘[i]nappropriate resource alloca-
tion can lead to discrimination that may not be overt.’109
Interestingly, General Comment 15 also highlights the
need to ensure ‘that disadvantaged and marginalised
farmers, including women farmers, have equitable
access to water and water management systems, includ-
ing sustainable rain harvesting and irrigation technolo-
gy.’110 The GA resolution on human right to water calls
106. ‘To stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources by develop-
ing water management strategies at the regional, national and local lev-
els, which promote both equitable access and adequate supplies.’ GA
Millennium Declaration, para. 23. ‘The manner of realization of the
right to water must also be sustainable, ensuring that the right can be
realized for present and future generations.’ General Comment 15,
para. 11.
107. General Comment 15, para. 11. Adequacy defined based on the follow-
ing factors: availability, quality and accessibility. General Comment 15,
para 12.
108. General Comment 15 explicitly lays down that ‘[w]hereas the right to
water applies to everyone, States parties should give special attention to
those individuals and groups who have traditionally faced difficulties in
exercising this right, including women, children, minority groups, indig-
enous peoples, refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons,
migrant workers, prisoners and detainees.’ General Comment 15,
para. 16. See also GA Millennium Declaration, 8 September 2000, III
and VI.
109. General Comment 15, para. 14.
110. Ibid., para. 7.
upon states to support developing countries, and
through this it essentially can achieve support for those
being in a vulnerable position.111
(3) Checks and Balances
Probably due to the focus of the human rights cluster on
the content of human right to water, there is not much
discussion about how to constrain the exercise of power,
in this case, of states. The most relevant, but actually
also the most general, reference to any control mechan-
isms is made in the GA Millennium Declaration, which
makes clear that democracy112 is essential for ensuring
the fundamental values of international relations. At the
interstate level, both General Comment 15 and GA res-
olution on human right to water and sanitation state the
need for international assistance and cooperation.113 An
additional ‘instrument’ enshrined in General Com-
ment 15 also serves as a ‘check-and-balance’ mechan-
ism: the prohibition to use water as a political and economic
pressure.114
4.2. Mapping the Current Status of
Constitutionalisation in Global Water
Governance
Comparing the traces of constitutionalisation in each
cluster, as explored above, the status (or extent) of con-
stitutionalisation in global water governance can be
mapped providing an indication about the nature of
water crisis when read through the lenses of GC.
First, there is no written or unwritten ‘constitution’ in
global water governance that would give directions to
the whole system. Second and closely related to this
previous point, the cluster-based exploration reveals the
differences among these clusters. There might be some
commonly shared approaches in the clusters, but a real
coherence cannot be observed among them: they seem
to operate in isolation, while addressing the same sub-
ject matter – from different perspectives and/or mate-
rial scope. Although fragmented, two main common
values can still be discovered in each cluster: the princi-
ple of equality and sustainability or ecosystem approach.
In addition, cooperation is acknowledged in each cluster
as a form of checks and balances. Besides these com-
monly shared elements, there also are some overlaps
between the economic and the ecological cluster115 as
well as between the economic and social justice
cluster,116 but clear overlaps can hardly be discovered
between the social justice and the ecological cluster. All
in all, the system can, indeed, be described as fragment-
111. GA Human right to water and sanitation, para. 2. See also GA Millenni-
um Declaration, VII; General Comment 15, para. 34.
112. GA Millennium Declaration, V.
113. General Comment 15, paras 30 and 38; GA Human right to water and
sanitation, para. 2.
114. General Comment 15, para. 32. ‘States parties should refrain at all times
from imposing embargoes or similar measures, that prevent the supply
of water, as well as goods and services essential for securing the right to
water. Water should never be used as an instrument of political and
economic pressure.’
115. E.g. focus on future generations, reference to IWRM.
116. E.g. focus on individuals, incorporation of water rights.
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ed, as noted by many scholars in relation to global water
law as well as general environmental law.117
Third, no particular hierarchy can be observed among
the clusters or within the clusters in terms of higher or
lower law, which eventually could give some direction
to law-making and law-application. Again, this confirms
that each cluster, or even each new legislative piece,
develops its own approach irrespective of the other clus-
ters and/or other rules adopted in the same cluster. One
might argue, though, that the above-mentioned two
recurring principles might create a certain hierarchy due
to their overarching nature.
Fourth, not only the material scope of each cluster is
different, but the clusters seem to have distinct personal
scope, form and locus of governance. Concerning the
first aspect, the ecological cluster addresses states and
states are also the explicit beneficiaries of the measures
taken, although implicitly individuals will also benefit
from these norms; the economic cluster also addresses
states, but it also explicitly embraces individuals as ben-
eficiaries; and finally, the social justice cluster’s addres-
sees are also states, but with a main focus on individuals
and vulnerable parties as beneficiaries of state obliga-
tions. While water use is governed mainly through trea-
ties in the ecological cluster, in addition to loan agree-
ments internal rules of the World Bank also govern the
project in the economic cluster. The social justice clus-
ter is also governed through treaties, but a certain role is
also given to legally non-binding UN instruments.
Finally, the ecological cluster is governed at the inter-
state level, the economic cluster through an internation-
al organisation (IO), and the social justice cluster both at
the inter-state level and through IOs. Notwithstanding
these observations, certain changes can be observed over
time; changes that might pull the approach of the clus-
ters towards the same direction, though they might use
different language for the very same phenomenon. In
other words, one might say that traces of constitutionali-
sation can be spotted in global water governance. This
‘pulling force’ is the acknowledgment that water has dif-
ferent dimensions (or different uses in other words),
which somehow all need to be addressed, and eventual
conflicts between the dimensions need to be balanced.
4.3. Constitutional Shaping of Global Water
Governance
Where would further or closer constitutionalisation lead
to in global water governance? How would further con-
stitutionalisation shape global water governance? These
are rather hypothetical questions, given the fact that
international law is generally seen as fragmented – both
in institutional and substantive sense –, not only with
regard to global water law. Nevertheless, in an ideal
constitutional situation, global water governance and
117. Gupta and Sanchez, supra n. 9, at 12-13.
global water law would become de-fragmented.118 This
de-fragmentation can take place in two ways. First, the
different clusters could become part of the same system
aiming to achieve the same objectives and having a
coherent and overarching global enforcement mechan-
ism (constitutionalisation proper). Second, de-fragmenta-
tion can also be achieved if it is ensured that, although
operating in their own sphere, each cluster incorporates
the points of the other cluster when making decisions
(constitutionalisation light). In this latter case, the pur-
pose of the different clusters would be to help achieve
appropriate balancing between the interests and needs.
Such balancing would require that attention be devoted
to the (potential) clashes between privatisation and
human rights, privatisation and sustainability, sustaina-
bility and state sovereignty and territorial integrity and
so on.
In addition to harmonising the material scope, de-frag-
mentation will also be achieved in relation to the constit-
uency119 (or personal scope) as well as the locus and
form of the decision-making in the global arena. Further
constitutionalisation would probably entail that the dis-
tinction between the global and the national constituen-
cies disappears and individuals and groups can become
direct addressees and beneficiaries of global decision-
making. This development also seems to be required by
the fact that water is a public good. All in all, the result
of stronger constitutionalisation would be a common
value-based, de-fragmented, more inclusive and less
state-centred governance with global enforcement and
monitoring mechanisms.
There are, however, certain obstacles or problems that
constitutionalisation faces. At least, three of such issues
can be identified. One of the main difficulties is how to
obtain state consent for further constitutionalisation.
Second, and closely related to this previous point, so far
most of the developments have been achieved by strictly
defined inter-state relations, and in the economic cluster
by the World Bank. This point then raises the question
whether states would be willing to transfer some impor-
tant aspects of their sovereignty to one global water gov-
ernance body. The argument has been made that ‘States
are unwilling to select one forum for a comprehensive
approach with which to deal with all problems; and one
comprehensive forum for global sustainable develop-
ment governance uniting trade, investment, develop-
ment and environment may not be feasible.’120 Last, the
118. On de-fragmentation see A. van Aaken, ‘Defragmentation of Public
International Law through Interpretation: A Methodological Proposal’,
16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 483 (2009). Dunoff and
Trachtman argue that ‘[t]o the extent that fragmentation arises because
of the lack of centralized legislative and adjudicative institutions, consti-
tutionalization can respond by providing centralized institutions or by
specifying a hierarchy among rules or adjudicators. That is, constitution-
alization can be seen as a way of introducing hierarchy and order, or at
least a set of coordinating mechanisms, into an otherwise chaotic sys-
tem marked by proliferating institutions and norms.’ Dunoff and Tracht-
man, supra n. 43, at 8.
119. N. Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’, 17 European
Journal of International Law 247, at 269-274 (2006).
120. Gupta and Sanchez, supra n. 9, at 19.
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substantive rules or constitutional principles of global
water governance also need procedural guarantees.121
Indeed, Cottier argued that ‘[p]rocedures are key and
where they are lacking, values cannot be realised.’122
4.4. Solving Water Crisis through
Constitutionalisation of Global Water
Governance?
How would further constitutional shaping of global
water governance contribute to solving, or at least pro-
vide some steps towards moderating, the global water
crisis? As indicated above, in addition to the fragmented
nature of water governance two main problematic issues
– as main factors of the water crisis – have generally
been identified: allocation of water and adaption to envi-
ronmental changes.
As far as the first issue is concerned, it is undoubted
that appropriate allocation is based on the idea of justice
or fairness, and stems from the fact that natural resour-
ces, and thus water, are public goods. What does then
‘appropriate allocation’ mean? One might say that this is
the focus of the human rights/social justice cluster. So
this cluster is not only one of the three approaches
towards water, but it is also a particular one, given its
focus on human dignity and autonomy, which is the
ultimate purpose and point of departure of constitution-
alisation.123 Hence, in order to be able to address this
cause of the crisis through constitutionalisation, this
cluster needs to be given a primary position in devising
the common principles and values of global water gov-
ernance.124 Interestingly, the concept of equality or fair-
ness can be found in each and every cluster to a certain
extent, which then shows some willingness to take this
issue on board.
The principle of sustainability (or ecosystem approach)
was also considered to have a particular status, given its
overarching nature. The need for adaptation/flexibility
is part of this concept and/or stems therefrom, which
then seems to be addressed to a certain extent at the
level of principles in each cluster separately. In order to
be able to address the crisis through further constitu-
tionalisation (either constitutionalisation light or prop-
er), sustainability should not be only one of the princi-
ples, but should also be a guiding one, and should serve
as a ‘building block’ for adaptive management.
All in all, given their importance, it could be argued that
these two principles could drive the constitutionalisa-
tion process with necessary specification and/or adjust-
ments, and any potential clash between them should
also be addressed in this process. If done so, it seems
that these two main factors could be addressed – at least
at the level of constitutional principles. The difficult
process of implementation will, however, still raise sev-
121. See, inter alia, T. Cottier, ‘Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and
Moral Conflict’, 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 647, at 678
(2009).
122. Ibid.
123. Gupta, supra n. 37, at 51.
124. Peters argues that the concept of constitutionalisation is essentially
based on humanity. A. Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’,
16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 397, at 398 (2009).
eral questions and lead to ambiguities. This point then
indicates that the problem might not be located at the
level of constitutional principles, but at the level of
implementation: how to interpret equality in concrete
cases relating to water allocation,125 how to create adap-
tive governance systems and so on. Constitutionalisation
probably cannot answer these questions in itself, but can
nevertheless indicate their importance by providing the
principles with constitutional status.
Interestingly, in relation to fairness, Franck argued that
‘[j]ustice-based claims generally focus on distributive
modalities and advance reasons for change in existing
entitlements and patterns of distribution. … They may
sacrifice expectations of stability in exchange for a new
and better order.’126 In his view, norms such as equality
would add dynamism to the system. However, in rela-
tion to constitutionalisation it has also been stated that
‘constitutional arrangements are notoriously conserva-
tive’.127 This observation relates to the system of checks
and balances, the difficult amendment procedures as
well as the slow process of changing an interpretation
that had earlier been given to a constitutional principle.
So to what extent such a constitutional stability can pro-
vide substratum for flexible approaches needed to
address changes in the environment as well as distribu-
tive justice concerns? While the constitutionalisation
process gives authority to the norms and equips them
with an overarching nature, at the same time it also pre-
serves what has been created in a particular moment of
time.128 This conclusion might then indicate that mech-
anisms that keep the interpretation of these principles
fresh and alive might need to be set in place, procedures
which GAL might envisage.
5. Through the Looking Glass
of Global Administrative Law
Similar to GC, global administrative law is also a project
to describe some trends and developments in interna-
tional law using concepts from domestic (or rather pub-
lic)129 law. As hinted at above, GAL focuses on three
main procedural issues,130 that is, transparency, partici-
125. It does not address the role of the private sector either. See, inter alia,
Hey, supra n. 4, at 352; Biswas, supra n. 35, at 234-235.
126. Franck, supra n. 32, at 477.
127. G.W. Brown, ‘The Constitutionalization of What?’, 1 Global Constitu-
tionalism 201, at 212 (2012).
128. See also Dunoff and Trachtman, supra n. 43, at 24. In their view, ‘con-
stitutions mediate between stability and change. … In fact, some would
say that this dynamic feature is a critical part, if not a constitution, then
of a constitutive process in a society.’
129. E. Hey, ‘International Public Law’, 6 International Law FORUM du droit
international, 149, at 151 (2004).
130. ‘The focus of the field of global administrative law is not, therefore, the
specific content of substantive rules, but rather the operation of existing
or possible principles, procedural rules, review mechanisms, and other
mechanisms relating to transparency, participation, reasoned decision-
making, and assurance of legality in global governance.’ B. Kingsbury,
N. Krisch & R.B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law’, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15, at 29 (2005).
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pation and access to justice.131 The underlying idea is
that these procedural elements are necessary (but not
sufficient) to ensure good governance, and enhance the
accountability of the entities exercising public power. It
has been argued that at the global level a global adminis-
trative space is being shaped, as increasingly more inter-
national institutions and other entities active in this are-
na are trying to comply with the requirements of good
governance. This school is often regarded as being more
unified than GC, in that it is more difficult here to find
different sub-schools.132 The GAL-project emphasises
its power to discover trends,133 while also highlighting
its normative potential.134
In this light and similar to the GC analysis, (1) after
tracing the trends of good governance in each cluster
(exploring), a comparative section will address the fol-
lowing questions: (2) to what extent is GWG driven by
the principles of ‘good governance’ (mapping), (3) what
would further ‘compliance’ with these requirements, or
further GAL-shaping of GWG, entail (shaping), and
(4) whether and to what extent such shaping can con-
tribute to solving the water crisis (solving)?
The following points will be highlighted in the analysis
below:
1. To what extent is attention paid to transparency in the
legal (either binding or soft law) documents?
2. How is participation ensured, who is enabled to par-
ticipate, what is the nature of this participation?
3. Are there mechanisms enshrined through which the
entities exercising public power can be held accounta-
ble for non-compliance with their obligations and/or
which enable those affected to have access to remedy?135
5.1. Exploring the Traces of Good Governance in
the Clusters
5.1.1. The Ecological Cluster
• Transparency
Transparency towards state parties and riparian states is
provided through different mechanisms. As indicated
above, the 1997 Convention mainly focuses on inter-
state relations. In terms of these inter-state relations
transparency is mainly ensured by regular exchange of
data136 and notification-consultation procedures.137 Simi-
131. See, inter alia, N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Govern-
ance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’,
17 European Journal of International Law 1 (2006); D.C. Esty, ‘Good
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law’,
115 Yale Law Journal 1490 (2006); C. Harlow, ‘Global Administrative
Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’, 17 European Journal of
International Law 187 (2006); Krisch, supra n. 120.
132. As explained above, in the more recent GC-literature GAL is regarded
as being part of the research on discovering constitutionalisation trends
at the global level.
133. Krisch and Kingsbury, supra n. 132, at 3.
134. Ibid., at 5-10.
135. As explained above, the focus here is on the enforcement of compliance
with obligations rather than exploring the mechanisms for constraining
in general the exercise of public power.
136. Art. 9 of the 1997 Convention; Art. 8 of the 2008 Draft Articles. See
also Arts. 6 and 12 of the Helsinki Convention.
137. Arts. 11-17 of the 1997 Convention.
larly, the Helsinki Convention and its Protocol I also
require states (all states, and in particular riparian states)
to ‘cooperate in the conduct of research’, the result of
which shall be exchanged.138
The Helsinki Convention and its Protocol I aim to ach-
ieve transparency through creating an obligation to pro-
vide the public with access to information.139 The provi-
sions not only lay down this obligation, they also define
how this has to be ensured. Finally, Protocol I also
emphasises the need for raising public awareness about
the importance of the relationship between water and
health as well as the rights, entitlements and obligations
relating to water.140
• Participation
An overarching or general principle of the 1997 Con-
vention is the equitable and reasonable participation of
state parties, as enshrined in its Article 5.141 Moreover,
next to their general obligation to cooperate, as indicated
above, states can also establish different joint mechan-
isms.142 Finally, public participation is a foundational
principle in the Helsinki Protocol I, which lays down
that
‘[a]ccess to information and public participation in
decision-making concerning water and health are
needed, inter alia, in order to enhance the quality and
the implementation of the decisions, to build public
awareness of issues, to give the public the opportuni-
ty to express its concerns and to enable public
authorities to take due account of such concerns.’143
Closely related to this aspect, the Protocol also requires
the involvement of locals, when it enshrines that ‘due
account should be given to local problems, needs and
knowledge.’144 Similarly, this Protocol also calls upon
states to create a platform for parties, where ‘the public,
private and voluntary sectors can make its contribution
to improving water management for the purpose of pre-
venting, controlling and reducing water-related dis-
ease.’145
138. Arts. 5 and 13(4) of the Helsinki Convention; Art. 9(4) of the Helsinki
Protocol I.
139. Art. 16 of the Helsinki Convention; Art. 10 of the Helsinki Protocol I.
140. Art. 9(1) of the Helsinki Protocol I.
141. ‘Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and pro-
tection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilise the water-
course and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development
thereof, as provided in the present Convention. ’
142. For instance, Art. 8(2) of the 1997 Convention enshrines that ‘[i]n
determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may
consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as
deemed necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant meas-
ures and procedures in the light of experience gained through coopera-
tion in existing joint mechanisms and commissions in various regions.’
143. Art. 5(i) of the Helsinki Protocol I.
144. Art. 5(n) of the Helsinki Protocol I.
145. Art. 4(5) of the Helsinki Protocol I.
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• Access to Justice/Accountability146
In this cluster different modes of accountability are
present: ensuring compliance with obligations and pro-
viding access to justice for those affected. In terms of
the former, the above-mentioned joint actions deserve
particular attention under the 1997 Convention. In the
Helsinki Convention two particular measures can be
highlighted in the context of broader accountability: the
obligation of parties to monitor the conditions of trans-
boundary waters147 (with particular rules for riparian
states)148 and ensure that environmental impact assessment
is applied.149 Protocol I also requires the establishment
of ‘effective systems of monitoring’ in relation to dis-
ease.150 Importantly, this Protocol vests the parties with
the mandate to ‘review the compliance of the Parties with
the provisions of this Protocol’.151
As opposed to these ‘broader’ accountability mechan-
isms, Protocol II was drafted in order to call upon states
to provide access to justice by creating civil liability
mechanisms for the benefit of individuals when
‘damages [are] caused by the transboundary effects of
industrial accidents on transboundary waters.’152 Last,
the 1997 Convention lays down that in case of trans-
boundary harm watercourse States shall ensure cross-
border access to justice without discrimination.153
5.1.2.  The Economic Cluster
• Transparency
Three main pillars of the transparency element can be
distilled in the water-related reports of the World Bank.
Interestingly, each of them relates to communication
ensuring that the necessary information is shared and
distributed. While the first is a general element, the two
others are specifically related to certain projects. First,
the Bank highlights in general the importance of building
knowledge and sharing it.154 ‘The Bank has been support-
ing client countries efforts to obtain better information
146. Although most states that ratified the Helsinki Convention are also
parties to the Espoo (Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment
in a Transboundary Context, adopted on 25 February 1991, entered
into force on 10 September 1997) and Aarhus Conventions
(Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted on
25 June 1998, entered into force on 30 October 2001), which impose
more far-reaching obligations on states in terms of accountability, the
focus here will be on the duties of states under the Helsinki Convention.
147. Art. 4 of the Helsinki Convention.
148. Art. 11 of the Helsinki Convention.
149. Art. 3(1)(h) of the Helsinki Convention.
150. Art. 4(2)(e) of the Helsinki Protocol I.
151. Art. 15 of the Helsinki Protocol I (emphasis added).
152. Art. 1 of the Helsinki Protocol II.
153. Art. 32 of the 1997 Convention. ‘Unless the watercourse States con-
cerned have agreed otherwise for the protection of the interests of per-
sons, natural or juridical, who have suffered or are under a serious
threat of suffering significant transboundary harm as a result of activi-
ties related to an international watercourse, a watercourse State shall
not discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence or place where
the injury occurred, in granting to such persons, in accordance with its
legal system, access to judicial or other procedures, or a right to claim
compensation or other relief in respect of significant harm caused by
such activities carried on in its territory.’
154. See, inter alia, Water Resources Sector Strategy, at 13; Sustainable
Water for All, at xiii or at 57.
for decision-making.’155 Second, in relation to ‘high-
reward–high risk’ projects ‘with spillovers that go well
beyond the country and the region’,156 there is a need
for the so-called ‘corporate projects’ approach, an
‘essential’ element of which is communication. In this
context communication means ‘the development of a
unified communication strategy for addressing head-on
in an open manner the concerns of different stakehold-
ers, including critics.’157 Third, in relation to projects
on international waterways, the Bank points to the need
of notification of all riparians before financing a project
on an international waterway.158 In addition, the general
rules concerning the decision-making within the Bank
are also applicable.
• Participation
In this segment of the economic cluster two main focus-
es can be distinguished: in relation to each project of the
Bank, participation of those who are or are potentially
affected by the Bank financed project; and in relation to
water projects, the participation of those who are sug-
gested to be involved in the domestic decision-making.
The requirement to ensure the participation of project-
affected people is enshrined in the operational policies of
the Bank.159 The OP prescribes that ‘[w]here the project
affects Indigenous Peoples, the borrower engages in
free, prior, and informed consultation with them.’160
Concerning resettlement, the OP lays down that ‘[i]n
projects involving involuntary restriction of access to
legally designated parks and protected areas …, the
nature of restrictions, as well as the type of measures
necessary to mitigate adverse impacts, is determined
with the participation of the displaced persons during
the design and implementation of the project’.161
In water-related projects, and in particular concerning
irrigation, the World Bank pinpoints the need for
‘[s]caling up user associations and ensuring that they are
representative of all farmers’,162 thus emphasising the
participation of these groups of people.
• Access to Justice/Accountability
Similar to the ecological cluster, two main modes of
accountability can be distinguished in this cluster too:
ensuring compliance with obligations and ensuring
access to justice of those affected.
155. Sustainable Water for All, at 36.
156. Water Resources Sector Strategy, at 48.
157. Ibid., at 48.
158. Compare with the recommendation of the World Commission on
Dams, according to which ‘where a government agency plans or facili-
tates the construction of a dam on a shared river in contravention of the
principle of good faith negotiations between riparians, external financ-
ing bodies withdraw their support for projects and programs promoted
by that agency.’ Ibid., at 78.
159. OP 4.10 and 4.12.
160. OP 4.10, para.10. In addition, ‘the Borrower is required to conduct a
social assessment to help assess the scope and extent of adverse
impacts, and to discuss proposals to avoid, or minimize and mitigate
them.’ Water Resources Sector Strategy, at 78.
161. OP 4.12, para 7.
162. Water Resources Sector Strategy, at 15 (emphasis added).
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One manner to ensure better compliance, as the Pro-
gress Report points out, is better monitoring of the water
projects, and for this reason ‘the Bank has begun devel-
oping a screening tool for water projects and will
explore how it can be implemented in water projects.’163
In addition, ‘the Bank will conduct a more thorough
review of the financial aspects of water projects …,
strictly enforce the projects’ financial covenants related
to cost recovery, and pay more attention to financial
issues in water projects in general.’164 This aspect also
relies on a broad conceptualisation of accountability, and
emphasises the need for continual assessment and evalu-
ation by the Bank in order to ensure the proper financial
management of projects.
In addition, better compliance can be guaranteed by effi-
cient/effective working of the projects, a clear emphasis
in the reports. E.g. the Bank highlighted the importance
of ‘effective and equitable use of utility subsidies’ at the
country level, which is assisted by the use of Water Pub-
lic Expenditure Reviews (PERs).165 A related point is
the so-called GAC (Governance and Anti-Corruption)
strategy, which requires that ‘water projects address
governance at the sector level by strengthening trans-
parency, accountability and participation across the val-
ue chain’.166 These two strategies aim to ensure the effi-
cient implementation of the projects at the domestic
level. In addition, this approach seems to indicate a
strong correlation between the extent of effective man-
agement of the projects and the degree of accountability.
Access to justice is guaranteed through the establish-
ment of the Inspection Panel. Those who may be
adversely affected by a Bank-financed project can sub-
mit their complaint to this forum. The task of the
Inspection Panel is to determine whether there has been
a violation of the operational policies and procedures by
the Bank.167
5.1.3. The Social Justice Cluster
• Transparency
Undeniably, General Comment 15 highlights the need
for access to information throughout the text. An essen-
tial factor for determining the adequacy of water
required for human right to water is ‘information accessi-
bility’, which ‘includes the right to seek, receive and
impart information concerning water issues.’168 As a
163. Sustaining Water for All, at 52.
164. Ibid., at 56. ‘The Bank will continue to improve the performance of the
water portfolio’, and ‘will continue to focus on the quality of its
engagement in the sector through regular portfolio monitoring.’
165. Ibid., at 32. ‘Water PERs have proved a useful instrument for dialogue
with client countries to tackle the issue of sustainability of water utilities
and tariffs’.
166. Ibid., at 30.
167. On the Inspection Panel see more here: <www.inspectionpanel.org>
(last visited 22 October 2012). See also Citizen-driven Accountability
for Sustainable Development: Giving Affected People a Greater
Voice – 20 Years On. A contribution to Rio+20 by the Independent
Accountability Mechanisms Network, 2012. For an academic analysis of
the Inspection Panel as a quasi-judicial oversight body, see A. Naudé
Fourie, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-judicial Oversight:
In Search of the “Judicial Spirit”’, in Public International Law (2009).
168. General Comment 15, para. 12(c)( iv).
core obligation, it explicitly calls upon governments ‘to
adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan
of action’, which ‘should be devised, and periodically
reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent
process’.169 Finally, individuals and groups should also
be timely and fully informed about the proposed measures
that might interfere with their right to water, as well as
be provided with the necessary ‘legal assistance for
obtaining legal remedies’.170
While the general comment focuses on the individuals’
access to information in relation to their water rights,
the GA resolution on human right to water and sanita-
tion emphasises the need for capacity-building and tech-
nical transfer by states in order to help each other, as
well as provide financial resources ‘in order to scale up
efforts to provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable
drinking water and sanitation for all’.171 Such efforts, if
complied with, are also important aspects of transparen-
cy – accessibility of the available technical and scientific
information relating to water and water management.
• Participation
General Comment 15 explains the different forms of
state obligations: respect, protect and fulfil. The right to
participation in relevant decision-making processes is
embedded in the obligation to protect.172 Similarly, as
also referred to in relation to transparency, ‘[t]he formu-
lation and implementation of national water strategies
and plans of action should respect, inter alia, the princi-
ples of non-discrimination and people’s participation.
The right of individuals and groups to participate in
decision-making processes that may affect their exercise
of the right to water must be an integral part of any poli-
cy, programme or strategy concerning water.’173 This
last point clearly pinpoints the close link to, or blurred
boundaries with, transparency and access to informa-
tion.
• Access to Justice/Accountability
Similar to the above clusters, both modes of accounta-
bility can also be found in the social justice cluster,
which are, however, more intertwined here. Under the
obligation to protect, states are expected to establish inde-
pendent monitoring mechanisms as well as to impose pen-
alties ‘[w]here water services … are operated or control-
led by third parties’ in order to prevent and effectively
address abuses.’174 As part of the core obligations, the
general comment lays down that states need to monitor
the realisation of the national water strategy. States might
also adopt framework legislations for the implementation
of their water strategy. This legislation then should set
up ‘institutional responsibility for the process’, ‘national
mechanisms for its monitoring’, and ‘remedies and
recourse procedures’.175 In addition to the responsibility
169. Ibid, paras 37(f), 48 and 49 (emphasis added).
170. Ibid., para. 56.
171. GA Human right to water and sanitation, para. 2.
172. General Comment 15, para. 24.
173. Ibid., para. 48 (emphasis added).
174. Ibid., para. 24.
175. Ibid., para. 50.
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of states for the national strategy, the Committee, using
rather strong language, also lays down that ‘[a]ny per-
sons or groups who have been denied their right to
water should have access to effective judicial or other
appropriate remedies at both national and international
levels’.176 Finally, states’ compliance with their treaty
obligations are monitored by the Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. Citizens of those
states that have ratified the Optional Protocol can also
submit individual communications to this Committee,
which is a form of access to justice.177
5.2. Mapping the Current Status of Good
Governance in Global Water Governance
Two main observations can be made about the nature of
the crisis when read through the lenses of GAL as
explored in each cluster. First, as the above overview
illustrated and similar to the constitutional aspects, each
cluster uses different forms and mechanisms to ensure
good governance. One can, nevertheless, find some
recurring elements relating to good governance: the
importance of information exchange, the involvement of
certain affected entities in the decision-making process
and monitoring. Remarkably, the question of who is
involved seems to depend to a great extent on the per-
sonal scope of the particular cluster. While the ecologi-
cal cluster relies on the concept of reasonable and equi-
table participation of states, the economic as well as the
social justice cluster both emphasise the participation of
individuals/groups affected by the measures at stake.
Second and notwithstanding these elements, the system
is yet far from fully complying with the requirements of
good governance. On the one hand, the lack of (qua-
si-)judicial enforcement mechanisms at the global level
is remarkable in two of the clusters.178 On the other
hand, some of the norms relating to participation and
transparency are somewhat vague in that indication of
concrete forms, means, channels or mechanisms is lack-
ing, meaning also that they are open to different inter-
pretations and/or compliance with these norms are hard
to enforce.
One must admit, though, that the extent to which one
can talk about good governance is difficult to measure
mainly because these procedural arrangements can be
devised only against or in relation to substantive rules
176. Ibid., para. 55. See also para. 56.
177. The Optional Protocol enshrining individual communications was adop-
ted in 2008 and is open for ratification since 2009. As of 3 February
2013 the tenth ratification required for entering into force has been
achieved.
178. Although the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
been ratified by the tenth state on 3 February 2013, the individual com-
plaint mechanism, a form of quasi-judicial enforcement, will only be
applicable for these ten countries. The monitoring activity of the Com-
mittee is different from this quasi-judicial review.
that give directions to them.179 Without such substan-
tive rules, the processes have no actual basis: it is then
unclear what should be transparent, who should partici-
pate in what, and what kind of accountability mecha-
nism needs to be devised. In other words, the appropri-
ateness of these procedural measures cannot be assessed
in themselves, they need to be set against the substan-
tive rules. Indeed, it can be observed that each cluster
has its own mechanism – similarly to the constitutional
analysis – which implies that they are set up in the light
of the existing substantive rules within their own clus-
ter. If we further follow this line of thought, it can be
argued that good governance can only be ensured if and
to the extent global water governance is constitutional-
ised.
5.3. Administrative Shaping of Global Water
Governance
From the above, it would follow that to the extent con-
stitutionalisation is possible and will be achieved, good
governance is also conceivable. Nevertheless, constitu-
tionalisation in itself will not bring about good govern-
ance, the procedural guarantees need to be adapted to
those constitutional guarantees and need to be designed
in accordance with them. These administrative meas-
ures then will ensure proper control by the constituen-
cies on the decision-making processes with regard to
each cluster. Indeed, it has been argued that
procedural fairness needs to be enhanced in global
water law by introducing a degree of formalism, asso-
ciated with the rule of law, in decision-making proce-
dures, both to ensure that the outcomes are fair in
terms of distributive justice at the level of both states
and individuals, but also to enhance, what Lon Fuller
found distinguishes law from other normative sys-
tems, good process.180
So the potential effects of further ensuring good govern-
ance could be the following: defining the constituencies
(addressees and beneficiaries), creating legitimate pro-
cedures, establishing institutionalised accountability
mechanisms, and designing stable feedback channels.
Similar to constitutionalisation, states’ willingness and
consent to establish more formal and effective proce-
dures are the main obstacles to achieving further admin-
istrative shaping of global water governance.
5.4. Solving Water Crisis through Ensuring Good
Governance in Global Water Governance?
Can good governance address the two main factors of
water crisis? As indicated above, good governance struc-
179. Concerning the GAL initiative it has been argued that ‘in the absence of
a simultaneous critique and reform of substantive law, GAL has only a
limited potential to further the cause of democracy and justice in the
international system. Indeed, without a concurrent concern with sub-
stantive law GAL may merely go to legitimize unjust laws and institu-
tions.’ B.S. Chimni, ‘Cooption and Resistance: Two Faces of Global
Administrative Law’, IILJ Working Paper 2005/16 Global Administrative
Law Series, at 2-3. See also Harlow, supra n. 132, at 189-190.
180. Hey, supra n. 4, at 369 (emphasis added).
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tures can be designed in the light of substantive princi-
ples giving guidance to the procedural principles of
transparency, participation and accountability. If the
constitutional principles relating to fairness/equality
and adaptation/sustainability are adopted as driving
principles, the question to be asked is whether GAL can
further contribute to solving the water crisis and/or
eventually filling the gaps constitutionalisation leave
behind?
Global administrative law focuses on procedure, or one
might say ensuring legitimate or fair procedures. These
procedures also have to enable fair allocation of water
resources and the operation of adaptation mechanisms.
They both require ample flexibility in the procedures,
which, given their formal nature, might, however, be
difficult to achieve in practice. Franck argued that pro-
cedures in themselves create order and stability in that
they bring formalism into the decision-making process-
es,181 at the same time they can also bring dynamism
into the inherently conservative constitutional relations
and help keep the interpretation of constitutional con-
cepts and principles up-to-date through participatory or
accountability ‘conversations’. Such dynamic inclusion-
ary mechanisms could provide useful guidance for
actual implementation, and could lead to de-fragmenta-
tion of both substantive and procedural rules.
6. IWRM through the Lenses
of GC and GAL
If IWRM is seen through the lenses of GC, it can be
clearly identified as a constitutional value or principle,
as was indeed the case in the economic and ecological
clusters. Although, one might say, essentially a manage-
ment and ecological principle, IWRM has the potential
to be read as a foundational principle of global water
law. In that case, the principle could contribute to (fur-
ther) constitutionalisation, and in particular de-frag-
mentation, of GWG by laying down the foundations
thereof, that is an integrated treatment of all aspects of
water resources. This ‘integration’ would imply that
even if different clusters remained operating (constitu-
tionalisation light), they would need to incorporate the
principles of each cluster when making decisions or
adopting certain policies. Irrespective of the fact wheth-
er or not institutional de-fragmentation will ever take
place (constitutionalisation proper), IWRM as a consti-
tutional principle has, accordingly, the power of achiev-
ing functional de-fragmentation. The focus of IWRM in
this understanding is on ensuring equality182 and sus-
tainability,183 while combining each cluster. If this,
181. Franck, supra n. 32, at 477.
182. ‘… to maximize economic and social welfare in an equitable manner’.
<www.gwp.org/The-Challenge/What-is-IWRM> (last visited 22 Octo-
ber. 2012).
183. ‘… without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems and the
environment.’ < www.gwp.org/The-Challenge/What-is-IWRM> (last
visited 22 October 2012).
indeed, is the case, then it also means that IWRM as a
constitutional principle focuses on addressing the two
main factors of water crisis, that is allocation of water
resources and mitigating the effects of climate change,
in parallel with having a de-fragmentation pull.
IWRM can also be placed in the GAL narrative, and can
be interpreted as a procedural concept. This under-
standing is actually supported by the second principle of
the Dublin Principles (1992) from which this concept
originates.184 This principle emphasised the need to cre-
ate a participatory system of water management. Under
this interpretation, the focus of the concept is on ‘coordi-
nated development and management of water, land and
related resources’.185 In other words, the aim of such an
approach would be to create a platform where the differ-
ent stakeholders representing different interests relating
to water can participate and work together in order to
ensure that the different purposes for which water is
used are balanced keeping in mind the three main fea-
tures of water (ecological, economic and human rights).
IWRM then implies that information relating to each
cluster should be made available (and should be collec-
ted); participation in the decision-making should be
ensured; and accountability mechanisms should also be
devised for addressing complaints relating to each clus-
ter. When creating this platform, IWRM further
requires that the principles of equality and sustainability
be observed. Important to note is that while IWRM as a
procedural principle seems to focus on the need to cre-
ate an interdisciplinary and inter-sectoral platform, it
does not specify who should actually participate (in the
broader sense) on this platform and what this platform
should look like.186
Could the introduction of the concept of IWRM help
solve the water crisis in addition to further constitution-
alisation and designing good governance? The above
analysis indicates that IWRM, if read as a constitutional
principle, inherently incorporates the answers to the
main factors of water crisis: it aims to ensure fair alloca-
tion and flexibility for adaptation.187 So it could essen-
tially act as a guiding principle, and if applied in each
cluster it could at least lead to constitutionalisation light.
When seen as a procedural concept, IWRM gives some-
what more concrete guidance about the need to create
common platforms and coordination; i.e. to integrate
different approaches through participation (in the broad
sense). So in this regard IWRM also leads to further
184. ‘Principle No. 2: Water development and management should be based
on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-mak-
ers at all levels.’ Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Develop-
ment, adopted on 31 January 1992, <www.un-documents.net/h2o-
dub.htm> (last visited 22 October 2012).
185. <www.gwp.org/The-Challenge/What-is-IWRM> (last visited 22 Octo-
ber 2012).
186. The concept of ‘affectedness’ might serve as a good candidate for iden-
tifying those entitled to participate as well as the constituency.
187. It has been argued that ‘[m]any of the principles that underlie the pro-
cess of IWRM planning also lend themselves to effective adaptation
planning. … The adaptive nature of IWRM planning and implementa-
tion are precisely what will be necessary to address the uncertainties
and changing information related to climate impacts that will trigger
various adaptation responses.’ Bruch and Troell, supra n. 38, at 831.
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formalisation of procedures. The very fact that a princi-
ple can be interpreted both as a substantive and a proce-
dural concept also confirms their interrelatedness.
Given the vagueness of the principle,188 however, simi-
lar obstacles remain as with regard to achieving consti-
tutionalisation or the introduction of more formalised
procedures. Indeed, this principle has been criticised for
not giving ample guidance how it should be implement-
ed in practice, that is the reason why compliance there-
with is lacking behind. In general, IWRM is addressed
to states with regard to domestic water uses under the
ecological cluster (and increasingly more under the eco-
nomic cluster), in relation to which the above critical
comments were made. Based on this, it can also be
expected that the principle would face the same con-
cerns at the global level as it does at the domestic level.
5. Final Reflections
Through this comparative analysis important insights
have been gained not only into global water governance,
but also into the relationship between global constitu-
tionalism and global administrative law.
The analysis revealed that at present GWG is indeed
fragmented, in that the three clusters operate separately,
rely on different principles, and use different proce-
dures – with negative impact on the legitimacy of global
water governance. This difference can probably be
linked back to the diverse personal scopes as well as the
diverse loci and forms of governance of each cluster. In
addition, formalised participatory procedures are almost
absent in global water governance, with the exception of
the economic cluster. Remarkably, it seems as if the
trend of constitutionalisation in water governance is
stronger than that of the formalisation of procedures.
The constitutionalisation trend might be interpreted as
illustrating that states are somewhat more willing to
agree upon substantive principles as long as no or no
strong procedural rules are attached to them – besides
classical international dispute settlement mechanisms.
Concerning the relationship between global constitu-
tionalism and global administrative law the following
three main observations can be made. First, both theo-
ries are somewhat idealistic in that they use ambitious
concepts and ideas that might be difficult to achieve in
practice. At first sight, GAL seems to paint a somewhat
more realistic picture because it adopts a hands-on
approach suggesting concrete steps to be taken, while
GC gives the impression of a much more romantic
painting in that it envisions and relies on the grandiose
idea of one community united for common goals. How-
ever, and this is the second observation, the analysis also
revealed that the appropriateness of procedural rules
(GAL) can be assessed only in light of substantive rules
(GC), which might also have some implications for the
188. See, inter alia, M. Muller, ‘Fit for Purpose: Taking Integrated Water
Resource Management Back to Basics’, 24 Irrigation and Drainage Sys-
tems 161, at 165 (2010)
relationship between these two theories. If read in this
light, then GAL might not seem to use more realistic
strokes than GC. Moreover, this substantive-procedural
relationship might also imply that ‘global constitutional-
ism stands in the background as the constitutive other to
the construction of the identity of global administrative
law’.189 If not necessarily for GAL’s identity, but GC is
definitely important for giving guidance for the shaping
of the administrative procedures. Third, this link
between substantive-procedural issues also illuminates
Franck’s theory on substantive and procedural fairness.
In Franck’s view there is a tension between the two con-
cepts of fairness due to their advancement of change and
order, respectively. If placed within the context of con-
stitutionalisation, this pull towards change and order
can also work the other way around, as argued above. In
any event, the point of substantive and procedural rules
being inherently linked is also adduced by Franck who
concluded that
while claims of legitimacy and justice can be symbiot-
ic, they may also be adversarial. Since legitimacy and
justice together constitute fairness which is perceived
as such, it is inevitable that fairness discourse will, in
large measure, take the form of attempts to reconcile
claims of legitimacy with those of distributive justice.190
This is what IWRM is essentially promoting: combining
(‘integrating’) the focus on substantive, fairness-driven
issues with procedural consequences.
The paintings of the two schools implicitly promote de-
fragmentation and formalisation as tools for addressing
water crisis, and enhance the legitimacy of GWG. While
de-fragmentation and formalisation might be desirable
from a legal perspective, politically they seem difficult
to achieve. The two paintings nevertheless leave us with
the following reflective questions: is it possible to get
beyond the inter-state paradigm and think globally; can
we create solidarity among states and among citizens?
189. Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘Between Fragmentation and Unity: The Uneasy Rela-
tionship Between Global Administrative Law and Global Constitutional-
ism’, 10 San Diego International Law Journal 439, at 466 (2009).
190. Franck, supra n. 32, at 476.
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